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A Dream of Scottish Secession (Standpoint Mag Online, 9 Sept, 2014)

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A year after the UK signed the Separation Agreement with Scotland, and two years after the Independence Referendum, negotiations between the two countries are dragging contentiously on. The remaining nations of newly dismembered Great Britain are in the painful throes of constitutional reorganization. Relations between Westminster and Edinburgh are chilly at best.

Nevertheless, Scotland’s President, Alex Salmond, head of state as well as head of government, (and likely to hold power for at least five more years under the new constitution written by the SNP), is in an upbeat mood.

He has just returned from a triumphant foreign tour, during which he was greeted by adoring crowds in Barcelona, Corsica, Venice and Quebec. (His barring from San Sebastian by the Spanish government gratifyingly prompted riots throughout the Basque Country.) Salmond is now a bona fide international celebrity and beloved of secessionists everywhere. In the British Isles, his speeches to the Welsh assembly and to the Irish Dail proposing a Celtic Federation are front page news.

The trip has raised Salmond’s spirits after some months of uncharacteristic gloom. For much of 2016 Salmond faced the most difficult challenge of his extraordinary career. The problem was not Scotland’s exclusion for the time being from the EU and Nato, but its financial crisis. Those economic warnings from Better Together that played so badly with Scottish voters turned out to be true after all1.

Fortunately for President Salmond and his country’s financial health, Scotland is not without wealthy and generous friends abroad.

There are friendship treaties in the pipeline with Venezuela and Iran. And the first formal State Visitor of the Salmond presidency on September 15, 2016 is none other Vladimir Putin himself.

It is actually a return visit. Salmond’s second official state visit to another country as President was to Moscow. (The first was of course to Paris where he raised his glass to the “auld alliance” at dinner with a slightly nonplussed President Ségolène Royale.)

Visits to China, where his reception was insultingly low key (Beijing doesn’t like separatist movements) and to the United States, where he was accorded only an informal five minute chat with President Elizabeth Warren have been less successful.

Putin’s early invitation to Edinburgh is a thank-you for the discreet financial support of SNP activities and candidates by Russian businessmen over many years, and the encouragement of Scottish independence by officials at the Edinburgh consulate.

Putin, who has never before been to Scotland, is clearly delighted by his reception, not least by the kilt-wearing Black Watch honour guard.

Up in the Highlands with President Salmond, Putin stalks and kills a large stag that just happens to wander across his sights on the first morning. Naturally he poses with the body of the beast, and footage of him deftly gralloching it with a survival knife is broadcast around the world. A kilted, shirtless Putin is similarly successful fishing for salmon on the recently purchased Presidential estate (bought for a song from a departing aristocrat).

Putin and Salmond are then flown from Aberdeen to an oil rig where Putin publicly offers discounted Russian helicopters for air-sea-rescue and also hydrofoils to protect Scottish fisheries, and to patrol the disputed maritime border between Scotland and the UK.

Informed observers say the offer is really an attempt to test the public relations waters and that the state visit is a cover for intense negotiation between the two Presidents about a new strategic relationship.

For Salmond, billions are at stake. And so are principles, in particular the SNP’s commitment to provide free higher education and medical care to Scotland’s citizens and to pay generous salaries to Scotland’s public sector workers. 

For his part, Mr Putin is more than happy to bankroll this brave new Scotland. As he points out in a speech at the opening of the grand new embassy in Edinburgh, Russia’s connection to Scotland goes back many centuries. Indeed Russia owes an enormous historical debt to Scots like the generals George Ogilvy, James Bruce and Patrick Gordon who served Peter the Great and enabled his great victories over the Swedes and Turks.

Putin points out that both countries share the same patron saint, and recalls that one of his favourite writers, Mikhail Lermontov, was of Scottish descent (a Learmonth), He himself has had an admiration for Scots culture since reading Robert Burns in translation at university, he says, and like so many other people around the world was inspired by movies like Braveheart.

“Scots independence must never again be compromised, for any reason” Putin declares, to the cheers of his audience. It is therefore his great pleasure to announce a comprehensive North Sea Economic Cooperation and Security Agreement between the two nations.

From now on, Russia will guarantee Scotland’s treasured freedom. And with the aim of helping the Scottish economy Moscow will lease the former Royal Navy submarine base at Faslane, paying more than five times the rent offered by the UK during the stalled post-independence negotiations.

Having visited the dockyards on the Clyde, President Putin is also delighted to announce that vessels of the modernizing Russian Navy will undergo refits there. Russia may also redevelop the old naval base at Scapa Flow with a view to making it a winter home for the Baltic fleet.

Finally, to the benefit of local economy and population, Russia will save the old RAF base at Lossiemouth from closing and reopen the one at Leuchars that was closed by the Tory British government in 2012. The two air stations will be shared by the Russian Navy and the Scottish Defence Force Air Wing. Until the latter has its own aircraft, Russia will offer, on a purely temporary basis, to provide maritime air patrols.

Westminster is stunned by the announcement. The United States, already aware that its global influence has been adversely affected by the diminished influence of the divided UK, is furious. There is panic in the Baltic states. Norway calls an emergency meeting of Nato defence ministers. The Swedish, Dutch, Danish and even the German governments are in uproar.

The British Prime Minister sends an outraged demarche to Edinburgh, saying that the deal with Russia is a “breach of the spirit of the Separation Agreement”.

Salmond’s response is quick and sharp: Scotland does not yield to threats no matter where they come from.

He appeals to Moscow, where Mr Putin declares that Russia can be relied on stand by her friends. He orders the symbolic deployment of a battalion of Russian Naval Infantry – the same size as the detachment of US troops sent to Poland and the Baltics during the 2014 Ukraine crisis – to Scotland, plus a flight of Su-35 fighter jets and a mobile battery of S-300 anti aircraft missiles to protect them. Putin also orders a task force led by the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov into the North Sea.

In Brussels Nato is divided between states calling for a general mobilisation and those who say that Scotland should immediately be invited to join the alliance to forestall a dramatic shifting of the East-West frontier into the North Atlantic.

Tony Blair writes an OpEd in The Times apologising for so carelessly setting in motion the process that led to Scottish secession.

A demonstration in Trafalgar Square by supporters of the new English National Party turns ugly, with hooligans kicking a well-known Scottish-accented BBC radio reporter.

David Cameron, widely blamed in the UK for losing Scotland, resigns his position as CEO (officially “Director of Dynamism”) of a leading public relations firm and quietly leaves the country.

As the UK considers moving a force of English and Gurkha (but not Welsh) troops to the border to symbolically counter what London claims is an illegal deployment of Russian forces in Scotland, the Russian-led successor to the Warsaw Pact, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) extends a formal invitation to Scotland. Salmond expresses gratitude for the offer without accepting it. London decides against moving troops to Hadrian’s Wall2

But then a convoy of Scottish nationalist demonstrators drives across the border and into Berwick-upon-Tweed where they raise the Saltire and occupy the town hall.  

At that point the alarm goes off.

 
 
 

1] Since the contentious split of the oilfields with the rump UK, it is now clear to everyone that income from North Sea oil is insufficient to make up for the fledgling country’s low tax base. And already, thanks to one of the lowest credit ratings in Europe, Scotland has found it difficult to borrow money from the international markets. It took Salmond and his cabinet by surprise when so many UK citizens sold their businesses and left, prompting a sharp decline in property prices. (The Sloane Ranger colony in Edinburgh departed en masse). They were also dismayed by how many Scots, given the opportunity to chose UK citizenship, did just that after London made clear that dual UK-Scots nationality would not be allowed and imposed a three month window for conversion to UK citizenship. If that weren’t bad enough, SNP sloganeering about “Scottish jobs for Scottish workers” prompted a nervous exodus of immigrants, in particular non-whites, despite the efforts of Hardeep Singh Koli, a junior minister in Salmond’s government, to persuade them to stay. The emigration of productive citizens has actually increased now that there is talk in both capitals of tightened visa restrictions and the imposition of customs duties. Although Salmond initiated the tit-for-tat with his popular restrictions on land ownership by foreigners, he genuinely did not expect the retaliation that followed, nor the sting of the British prime minister’s jibe that Scotland had become “the Zimbabwe of the North.”  

[2] It shows similar forbearance when Salmond claims the tiny island of Rockall in the North Atlantic as Scottish territory. TV cameras cover the ceremony as his envoy, landed on the granite islet by Russian special forces deploying from a submarine, raises the Scottish flag. Not only is the Royal Navy powerless to prevent the occupation but one of its frigates is boarded and briefly taken over by Russian special forces in an incident that recalls the 2007 HMS Cornwall incident in the Persian Gulf.

 
 

The Twitter Hypocrisy of Kenneth Roth (Commentary Sept. 2014)

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It is not yet clear if Twitter, the social-media site whose users send out 140-character mini-statements, is generally good or bad for public life, or for the mental health of its users. But it is inescapable: Campaigners, politicians, and rock stars use it to maintain a constant presence in the online lives of their followers. Marketing executives are obsessed with it. “Old-media” editors follow it slavishly in the foolish belief that retweets actually indicate movement in public opinion, rather than mini-campaigns by obsessives or lazy clicking by people who are bored at work.

The behavior of Twitter users can be wonderfully, unintentionally revealing. This is not so much the case for occasional users, who may choose to tweet only about one particular interest, or one side of themselves, or who just crack jokes. But in the case of some public figures, the urge to tweet can unwittingly disclose truths they would probably prefer to keep hidden. That seems to be the case for Kenneth Roth, the executive director of Human Rights Watch, one of two dominant behemoths among the myriad pressure groups around the world that describe themselves as human-rights organizations. Each year, Human Rights Watch publishes more than 100 reports and briefings on human-rights conditions.

His organization may cover 90 countries a year, but during the month of July, Roth’s Twitter feed was dominated to an extraordinary degree by one specific country: Israel and its conduct of the war with Hamas. No other subject received half or even a third of the attention. On some days up to half of Roth’s tweets (and he can tweet up to 40 times in a day, including retweets) were devoted to Gaza. Most of those concerned alleged Israeli violations of the laws of war, though now and again there was a dutiful observation that Hamas, too, should observe the Geneva Conventions.

For example, on July 23, out of 28 tweets by Roth, 12 were critical of Israel. They included these:

In face of @HRW’s detailed evidence of attacks on civilians, #Israel ambassador just blathers about “kangaroo court.”

US is shamefully alone in opposing UN rights council investigation for #Gaza. It passes anyway, 29 to 1; 17 abstain.

UN rights council should ask UN rights chief to investigate war crimes by both sides in Israel-Hamas conflict.

 Names, ages & genders of 132 Palestinian children that #Israel has killed in #Gaza this month: http://trib.al/KidhhPX

 Speaks for itself: #Israel ambassador says IDF deserves Nobel Peace Prize for its “unimaginable restraint” in #Gaza.

 Despite “Israel’s legitimate right to defend itself…military operation must be proportionate & in line w/…law”: EU

 #Israel seems to use argument against “moral symmetry” with Hamas to seek immoral exemption from Geneva Conventions.

Cheap excuse. There were no “human shields” when Israel targeted boys on beach, attacked hospital, killed 25 in house

That last tweet is worth examining, because it gives a sense of the tone that underlies all the others. Many observers, especially those who run organizations concerned about the rights of the innocent, might have been inclined to take their time and investigate rather than assume that Hamas would never lie about such a thing. Not Roth. He might not have been there on that beach, but the clear sense one gets from this tweet is that he knew, knew in his marrow, that the IDF was out for Gazan blood. He might never have fired an artillery piece or sent or received coordinates or been under fire, but there are some things you just know. Like the fact that the IDF is driven by vengeance and is looking for reasons to kill Arab kids—even though that would mean Israel was violating military law and the Geneva conventions, and even though IDF leaders would have every reason to know such an attack would be a propaganda victory for the enemy.

Other things happened in the world in July 2014 that you might think would have been of at least equal interest to the director of America’s biggest and most powerful rights organization. The last week in July was the worst in Syria’s civil war for some three years—with 1,700 deaths at the hands of parties who pay little attention to the Geneva Convention. Meanwhile, the terrorist group Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) persecuted and drove out the Christians of Mosul.

Roth did tweet about the crises in both places—in particular about the barrel bombs used in Syria—but with nothing remotely like the obsessive energy he brought to the Israel issue. He also tweeted occasionally about other matters (Equatorial Guinea, Russia, China, Libya, Burma, Ethiopia, the Iraqi government’s use of indiscriminate bombing, Arizona executions, Poland having “aided CIA renditions and torture,” and “the insanity of US marijuana prosecutions,” etc.). Oddly, he only mentioned the African Islamist group Boko Haram a handful of times despite the fact that his own organization was coming out with a report on its depredations—and he didn’t think it worthy of notice that its actions in July included abducting the wife of the deputy prime minister of Cameroon, setting off a suicide bomb on a college campus, and taking over a town in North Eastern Nigeria where its terrorists murdered more than a hundred people.

What is going on here?

For several years now, critics of Human Rights Watch—including the organization’s co-founder and chairman emeritus, Robert Bernstein—have pointed out that it directs a disproportionate amount of critical attention to Israel, a country that, unlike most others in the Middle East, has a large and flourishing civil society and human-rights sector of its own. HRW has usually batted away that claim by pointing out that other countries in the Middle East have been the subjects of as many or more HRW “reports.” This is a disingenuous response, because the overall amount of material put out on Israel, measured by words and pages, is strikingly out of balance and because HRW’s reports on Israel are uniquely accompanied in almost every case by high-profile press releases and press conferences. As its executive director, Roth has devoted much of his letter writing and public work to alleged Israeli crimes, to the exclusion of other matters. And he has taken his conduct to Twitter.

It is not only the frequency of his Israel-related tweets that leaves little doubt that the Jewish state 
occupies a special, preeminent place in Roth’s pantheon of villains. It’s also what he chose to tweet. He jumped on any and every critical piece in the papers. Moreover, the sneering tone of many of his tweets rather undermines his claim that he has no special animus against Israel and was just giving that human rights–abusing, international law–breaking country the critical scrutiny that it so obviously deserve.

For example, here were some of his tweets from the last week in July:

If abiding by laws of war isn’t incentive enuf for #Israel to avoid killing civilians, the p.r. disaster should be.

Why does #Israel condemn #Hamas for firing from a cemetery? Duty is not to endanger living civilians, not dead ones.

It’s far too facile to pass off global condemnation of #Israel’s West Bank settlements & reckless killing of Gaza civilians as anti-Semitism

No excuse for Israel shelling school killing 20. Hamas “in vicinity” not enough. Precautions, not targeting, is issue

Roth seemed delighted to tweet the declaration of the BBC’s notoriously anti-Israel editor Jeremy Bowen, who “saw no evidence during my week in Gaza of Israel’s accusation that Hamas uses Palestinians as human shields.” He was even more pleased when the New York Times echoed his own narrowly legalistic definition of human shields: “Hamas is putting civilians at risk but ‘no evidence’ it forces them to stay—definition of human shields: @NYTimes.” He must have known perfectly well that a “human shield” in the normal use of the term can be voluntary; he probably knew some of the American anti-war activists who served as “human shields” for Saddam Hussein in the run-up to the Iraq War.

Roth’s pleasure was apparent when he tweeted a New York magazine blog post that claimed that an Israeli spokesman had admitted that the kidnapping of three Israeli boys that ignited the current fighting had not been perpetrated by Hamas: “Remember when #Israel insisted Hamas was behind kidnap-murder of three West Bank teens. Oops, turns out it wasn’t.” That article and its claim were later discredited; Roth did not see fit to tweet that correction of fact.

Occasionally Roth remembered that he is supposed to be holding both sides to the standards mandated by international law, but his notion of balance seemed to be an eccentric one given the context. Hence on July 27: “Judging by the vitriol of its defenders, #Israel seems to be losing the p.r. war. Time to start respecting Geneva Conventions. #Hamas, too.”

You can feel the grudging dutifulness of the Hamas add-on. Which is odd, given that Hamas’s entire strategy is based on violating the Geneva Conventions. Roth appeared loath to admit that it is standard operating procedure for Hamas to endanger the civilian population of Gaza for military advantage. (Hamas knows that the Israelis may hesitate to fire on rocket launchers, ammunitions stores, and command centers if the obvious likely cost in civilian lives outweighs military necessity, and Hamas also knows that if the Israelis do fire, then the propaganda advantage compensates for the loss of the target.)

Roth certainly showed no awareness—though he must have been told, must have been briefed—that the IDF frequently chooses not to engage tactically important targets out of deference to both the Geneva Conventions and humanitarian considerations. And he gave the IDF no credit for the multiple warnings—including telephone calls—of impending missile and air strikes. These are a unique practice in the annals of warfare.

This is not to say that the IDF doesn’t get things horribly wrong—it’s all too clear that it does—or that its use of indirect fire in the conflict is not problematic, or that warnings are not sufficient if civilians have no place to take shelter.

But if Roth really understood the logic behind the Geneva Conventions and was honest about them, there would surely have been dozens of tweets from him calling for Hamas to stop endangering the civilian population of Gaza by placing rocket launchers in and around schools, by putting military headquarters in hospitals, and so forth. The few such tweets he did post tended to have an oddly surprised tone, like this one from July 30: “This is becoming a bad habit. #Hamas should never be storing weapons in UNRWA schools. Schools should be protected.” Apparently Roth was remarkably unaware that Hamas routinely keeps rockets in, and launches rockets from, civilian areas and protected targets such as hospitals and schools.

Roth was not alone among the professional human rights–worker class in his selective outrage and inability to see the gross illegality Hamas practices. For example, he retweeted a statement from the International Committee for the Red Cross that “firmly condemns…extremely alarming…attacks against humanitarian workers, ambulances, & hospitals.” But in so doing, both he and the ICRC were deliberately ignoring the pattern of the unlawful use of ambulances and hospitals for military purposes. The very reason international law dictated the use of symbols such as the Red Cross on battlefields was to create a zone of safety around them. When militants use those symbols as camouflage, they are the ones who are destroying the system.

The exploitation of such norms by militants and insurgents was a common feature of the Iraq War. Any U.S. Marine who fought in Fallujah will tell you about the many times that the insurgents used ambulances to ferry fighters and munitions. When coalition forces fired on ambulances being used as troop carriers, they were duly condemned around the world as war criminals. In fact, under a rational and unbiased reading of the laws of war and armed conflict, those who misuse ambulances that way are the war criminals.

Not to have admitted this reality was disingenuous at best. But then so were Roth’s assertions that the UN Human Rights Council—the one lately chaired by Syria and Libya—is a morally serious body.

To wit:

NYTimes dead wrong saying UN rights council “focused entirely on Israel” in launching Gaza probe. Still no correction.

UN rights council recently launched investigations for Syria, SriLanka & NKorea but when it does for Gaza (both sides) it’s accused of bias.

Roth also chose to take the Hamas casualty claims, delivered via the Gaza health authorities, as gospel—as did many media organizations. Here he tweeted a Washington Post graphic of the death count: “Palestinian Gaza deaths: 116 militants, 571 civilians. If that’s precision, who is the target?” Even if those numbers were accurate at the time, which is questionable, a serious analyst would surely have been concerned about whocounts as a civilian, who did the classification, and on what basis. In the past, Gaza police were counted as civilians, as were teenaged fighters. A serious analyst would also have been highly aware of the military usefulness to one side of the ability to claim, truthfully or otherwise, a massacre of civilians. Roth displayed none of the skepticism that such an understanding engenders.

The Washington Post graphic to which Roth linked demonstrates the problem. Genuinely random or reckless fire in civilian areas would be likely to kill a more or less equal number of males and females. Yet according to that same graphic, only 121 out of 749 Palestinian “civilians” were women. That is 121 too many, and something to be regretted and explained, but it should have made any objective observer wonder at the civilian status of the males and whether they were not in fact mostly combatants.

It was the small things that really gave away the obsessive nature of Roth’s attitude toward Israel. In July, he tweeted on more than one occasion a complaint about Israel State Radio:

Israel state radio won’t let @BTselem rights group read names of #Gaza children killed. Only cold numbers allowed.

“Don’t mention the children”: Michael Rosen poem on Israel state radio refusal to allow reading dead Gaza kid names

 Not once did he mention the Hamas TV broadcast in which a Hamas cleric declares that “we will exterminate” the Jews, “every last one.”

Roth’s Twitter feed at the end of July featured no tweets on the reports that Hamas fired an anti-tank missile from a Khan Younis mosque or that the al Wafa hospital was used as a command center and rocket-launching site. Nor was there a word about the growing evidence that Hamas has used threats to prevent journalists from taking pictures of fighters, rocket sites, or anything that might detract from a narrative of a one-sided war against civilians.

It is an interesting question as to why Roth seems to have such a disproportionate bugbear about Israel—and why HRW under his watch has hired so many people from what HRW program director Iain Levine calls “solidarity backgrounds” who are highly unlikely to be objective observers of Israel and Palestine.

Ideology presumably plays a role: All too often HRW fails to give authoritarian left-wing governments in Latin American countries like Ecuador and Bolivia the attention they deserve while directing disproportionate attention at countries the left tends to dislike, such as post-genocide Rwanda. But it’s not simply a matter of his being a man of the left. After all, so is Bernstein, and so are many other people who don’t believe that Israel should be subject to especially hostile and prejudiced scrutiny. It could have something to do with the interests of his fundraisers, or reflect a desire to maintain good relations with some of the media organizations on whose favor HRW depends. Or it could be something personal.

It is possible that simply heading an organization such as HRW—which today draws its staff and support from the left and arrogates to itself the status of a quasi-court of international law rather than a political-pressure group—leads to a kind of déformation professionnelle. But it often feels as if Roth has a religious sense of mission regarding Israel; it’s his crusade. In general, Roth never admits to being wrong and consistently represents HRW and its staff as infallible (except when, as was the case with Richard Goldstone and former military expert Mark Garlasco, they change their mind about alleged Israeli war crimes). But he responds with particular, extraordinary ferocity to any and all skeptical questioning of himself and the organization concerning Israel. HRW is of course not alone in subjecting Israel to disproportionate attention and particularly hostile scrutiny. Amnesty International does the same, and indeed its priorities have become even more distorted by the agendas of the left than have HRW’s.

Nor is it only Israel that prompts a disproportionate abundance of publicity efforts and a frequency of reports by HRW. The United States merits particular HRW scrutiny for its death penalty, its drug laws, its alleged persecution of Muslims in the name of anti-terrorism, Guantanamo Bay, and alleged torture during the war on terror. These are all legitimate subjects of concern, but, as Robert Bernstein has pointed out, the United States has many, many domestic-rights organizations, not least the ACLU and Human Rights First. Given this fact, it is hardly necessary for HRW to join the American fray. HRW was, after all, founded to promote human rights in closed and authoritarian societies, and there are plenty of countries where its well-funded efforts and influence are desperately needed. One must conclude that the reason for its scrutiny of America, like its scrutiny of Israel, is not objective necessity but the ideological inclinations of its leadership and staff.

It is worth noting that HRW’s attention often seems to depend not on the scale of a crime or even the identity of the victim (they don’t seem to care as much about Arabs killed by Arabs, or Muslims killed in Indian Kashmir) but on the identity of the perpetrator. In other words, they care more about certain bad guys than others, and it is this fact that determines the scale and intensity and tone of attention. And it is meaningful that among its bad guys are the United States and Israel—two democratic countries.

Human Rights Watch does invaluable work in many parts of the world in the tradition that began when Robert Bernstein, Orville Schell, and Aryeh Neier founded Helsinki Watch in 1978. Today, Roth and his coterie exploit HRW’s justly admired reporting from places other than the Middle East to give credibility to their anti-Israel advocacy. It’s bad enough that the lack of integrity in that advocacy (including the subjective, less-than-rigorous “investigations” concerning alleged Israeli crimes) undermines HRW’s overall credibility. But as polemicists and activists, they are figuratively firing at Israel from inside a Red Cross ambulance—and in so doing, are violating the most basic norms of honesty and proper conduct.

 

The Twitter Hypocrisy of Kenneth Roth

Can An Independent Kurdistan Reshape the Middle East (Newsweek Jul. 29, 2014)

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When Isis militants stormed the Iraqi city of Mosul in June, the disastrous fragility of Iraq’s armed forces was laid bare.  It also ignited a process that may lead to the setting up of the world’s first independent Kurdish state.

Since the departure of US forces from Iraq in 2011, relations between the Iraqi administration led by Nouri-al-Maliki and the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) have deteriorated. The Maliki administration has, according to Kurdistan’s High Representative in London, Bayan Rahman, imposed “a policy of control and punishment”.

She explains that the region’s grievances with Maliki include Baghdad’s failure to hand over the KRG’s full 17% share of the national budget (it has never paid more than 11% and has paid nothing since January 2014), its failure to pay the salaries of the Kurdistan national guard, known as the Peshmerga, and its alleged efforts to hinder Kurdistan’s oil and gas sales abroad.

What’s more, Rahman says the central government has failed to carry out its obligations under the 2005 Iraqi constitution to hold a referendum in disputed, historical Kurdish territories such as the city of Kirkuk, which the Kurds claim should be part of Kurdistan.

Rahman says that “40% of Kurdish territory lies outside the regional border unilaterally drawn by Saddam Hussein in 1991”. These areas, some of them oil-rich, were subjected to ethnic cleansing and government-ordered settlement by Arabs from other parts of Iraq. They have now fallen under Kurdish control as a result of the Iraqi Army’s retreat from Isis.

Unlike many of the minority ethnic groups that fought unsuccessfully for their own states in the late 20th century, Iraqi Kurdistan has achieved something close to independence without actually declaring it. That is not because Iraq’s Kurds don’t want formal independence.

As the former diplomat and Iraq expert Peter Galbraith says: “I’ve been going to Kurdistan for 30 years and I’ve never met a Kurd who said I’d prefer to be a citizen of Iraq than a citizen of an independent Kurdistan, and that includes the [former] President of Iraq himself.” 

Rather, it is because until now the KRG’s ­leaders have seen advantages in remaining legally linked to Iraq, and because the obstacles to independence, in particular opposition from Arab Iraq, seemed impossible to overcome.

Ever since it was first negotiated in the 1960s, Iraqi Kurdish autonomy proved hard to achieve and hold. Even when Saddam’s forces were prevented from ­ravaging Iraq’s Kurdish areas by the post-Gulf War no-fly-zone, and then by the US-led ­invasion in 2003, Iraqi Kurdistan remained under threat from Turkey. Ankara had long viewed any manifestation of Kurdish nationalism in the region as a danger to its own social cohesion and was willing to use force to neutralise it.

However, since 2009 there has been a rapprochement, to the extent that Turkish officials have signalled that they would be happy with an independent Iraqi Kurdistan.

These days it is Iran that has become an implacable opponent of Kurdish independence. Syria potentially would be another but its ruling regime is busy fighting a civil war. Iran was friendly to Iraqi Kurdistan when the latter was a source of support in the war against Saddam’s Iraq. But its sympathies have cooled as Tehran has become the dominant influence over Baghdad.

“If you look at Iranian media there is a campaign against the Kurds suggesting that the push for independence is all an Israeli plot,” declares Galbraith

In a bizarre confluence of interests, the only other country that seems equally opposed to Iraqi Kurdistan’s independence is the United States. American commitment to a unitary centralised Iraqi state has actually deepened under the Obama administration, despite Vice President Joe Biden once proposing the partitioning of Iraq into three countries.

The Kurdish nationalist movement could unite around 40 million ethnic Kurds under one banner Adam Jones

Galbraith says that the Obama administration has backed Baghdad and pressured the KRG by, among other things, “trying to stop people from buying Kurdistan’s oil, and threatening legal action against companies trying to import into the United States”.

Such economic pressure is no minor threat for a country of only six million people that has taken in some 250,000 refugees from Syria and about 750,000 refugees from other parts of Iraq. However, it’s not clear that America has much leverage over the question: after US opposition made little difference to the breakups of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.

Some experts, including the journalist and investor Bartle Bull, who is writing a history of Iraq, are not so sure that independence is inevitable. “Yes the KRG is a big winner of recent events and has been strengthened in its disputes with Baghdad,” he says. But if the KRG wins a referendum in Kirkuk [for that traditionally Kurdish, oil-rich region to join with Kurdistan] then its grievances with Baghdad decrease.”

Independence, with all its complications and risks, would therefore be less necessary.

Bull believes it is the “destiny” of Iraqi Kurdistan “always to be loosely, uncomfortably but definitively linked to the rest of Mesopotamia”. He suspects that the drive to independence may lose momentum if Isis is defeated and Maliki is replaced as Iraqi prime minister by a more acceptable and more able Shia politician. “Any likely new government would rule better, could not be as incompetent and sectarian and paranoid as Maliki’s, and that would make staying in Iraq that much more attractive for both Kurds and Sunnis.”

Galbraith and many other observers disagree and think Iraq “unfixable”. Gary Kent, who heads the UK’s All-Party Parliamentary Group on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, sees it as unlikely that “Baghdad with a new leader and a new form of governance can reach out to the Sunnis and keep promises it has broken to the Kurds and defeat Isis.”

That Maliki has become more hostile to the KRG since the Mosul debacle, accusing it of being in league with Isis, makes reconciliation seem even less likely. If Kurdistan does declare its independence it may struggle for international recognition.

According to Brendan O’Leary of the University of Pennsylvania, the new state might be quickly recognised by Turkey and Israel “but it would be much better to have comprehensive recognition”. He thinks it is highly unlikely that any member of the Arab League will recognise an independent Kurdistan, so the EU and the US will be key. But EU recognition might be tricky because “Spain would almost certainly block recognition of Kurdistan given its position on Kosovo”.

In general it is rare for the international community to recognise new states unless the former ruling power recognises them first. The refusal of Somalia to recognise the breakaway Somaliland Republic, which has been independent for two decades, has meant that no other country does so. Baghdad might be equally unwilling to recognise Iraqi independence. O’Leary sees the KRG as having two other choices given the weakness of the Baghdad government. It could try to renegotiate the existing constitution with a Baghdad that it does not trust. Or it could work towards the refashioning of Iraq as a confederation of two or three sovereign states with those states having a right to secede after a specified time.

Such confederations are rare. One recent ­example was that of Serbia and Montenegro, Another was the confederation of Sudan and South Sudan but both ultimately broke up.

Whether an independent Kurdistan could flourish is another question. Not only would it have to deal with threats from Isis and the deadly chaos in Syria, but would need to defend itself from whatever state emerges in Iraq.

Even in the best of circumstances an independent Kurdistan would need to cultivate other foreign friends lest it become a kind of dependency of Ankara. The KRG has long hoped for closer alliances with the US, the UK and other Western countries, but Gulf States like the United Arab Emirates have been quicker to invest in Kurdistan. As Gulf assistance often comes with Islamist strings attached, the idea of close relationships with countries like Qatar makes some Kurds nervous. Experts disagree as to how quickly or even whether Kurdistan will declare its independence.

In any case there seems little chance of a return to the status quo ante. As the prime minister of Iraqi Kurdistan, Nechirvan Barzani has put it, “there is Iraq pre-Mosul, and Iraq post-Mosul”.

Regardless of whether Iraqi Kurdistan pursues sovereignty plus confederation, or full independence, right now it faces a more immediate ­problem. As experts who testified on Kurdistan to the British parliament recently pointed out, the KRG has a 1,000km border with the Isis Caliphate and only 50km border with Iraq.

Moreover, Isis now fields armoured vehicles and artillery pieces captured from the fleeing Iraqi Army, while Kurdish forces have little more than small arms.

As Galbraith puts it: “The ironic fact is that the US has ended up arming Isis, which is our enemy, and not the Peshmerga, who are our friends.”

 

http://www.newsweek.com/2014/08/08/can-independent-kurdistan-reshape-middle-east-261858.html

Stop Messing the Kurds Around (Breitbart - London 23 July 2014)

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One of the less attractive characteristics of the Anglo-Saxon powers is their post-war habit of betraying third world allies, whether they are Vietnamese Montagnards, Afghan interpreters or belong to one of several less well-known minorities that have paid a grim price for trusting Britain or America to reward their loyalty.

The Kurds of Iraq are the latest to find themselves in the position of under-appreciated and betrayed allies.

Grateful for the US-British-French no-fly-zone that kept Saddam’s forces out of Kurdistan after the 1991 Gulf War, the Kurds have long been the most pro-American and pro-British ethnic group in the entire region. They were enormously helpful to the Coalition before and during the invasion of Iraq and defeat of the Saddam regime in 2003.

Iraqi Kurdistan could then have asserted its independence, kept control of historically Kurdish (but partially ethnically cleansed) Kirkuk and done little or nothing to help the authorities in Baghdad fight the Sunni insurgency and Shia militia violence that spread through Iraq from 2004.

Instead, as any allied commander who is worth his salt will tell you, Kurdish battalions were invaluable to Coalition efforts. Not only were they good at counter-terrorist operations, they were also reliable and trustworthy, qualities all too rare among Iraqi Security Forces especially in the early years.

Nevertheless, even at the height of the war, and even though they often fought side by side Coalition forces in Baghdad and elsewhere, the Kurds received minimal military assistance from the Coalition.  

When America pulled its troops out of Iraq in 2011, after Prime Minister Malik and President Obama failed to find common ground on a Status of Forces Agreement, you might have expected the US and its allies to cultivate the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG).

After all, Kurdistan was then, as it had been during the fighting, and continues to be today, much more stable, peaceful and economically vibrant than the rest of Iraq. And unlike the Maliki government it was not falling under the malign influence of Iran.

Instead, the US government has consistently backed the Baghdad government in its worst behaviour to the Kurds.

Under the Iraqi constitution, oil and mineral resources can be extracted and sold by the regions as long as the proceeds are shared with the rest of the country. But Baghdad has refused to pay the KRG the 17 percent of revenues that it committed to (it never paid more than 11 percent and stopped paying altogether in January. Baghdad also never ponied for the salaries for Kurdish troops.). It has also tried to stop Iraqi Kurdistan from selling oil and gas to Turkey and elsewhere.

Amazingly the US State Department has joined with Baghdad in trying to stop foreign buyers from taking Kurdish oil and gas, with the US government actually threatening legal action against anyone trying to buy it in the United States.

The KRG could be forgiven for resenting this American economic warfare on behalf of the corrupt and incompetent and Iranian-leaning Maliki regime, especially given that Iraqi Kurdistan has to feed and house 750,000 refugees from Syria and at least 250,000 displaced people form other parts of Iraq.

And the F-16’s promised by Washington to the Iraqi Air Force have rightly been seen as a potential threat by the Kurds who have vivid memories of bombardment by Saddam’s jet fighters.

The bizarre American approach to the US’s most reliable allies has three roots.

The first is the fact that the US government and in particular the State Department, prefers strong unitary states with only one center of power and set of leaders to talk to. The second is more emotional: after putting so much effort, blood and treasure into rebuilding and defending Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam it feels right to back the central government even if the complaints and claims of the Kurds are valid.

Finally, the fact that the Kurds unquestionably did gain from the overthrow of the Baathist regime makes them unattractive to people in or out of the Obama administration who opposed the war or who saw George W Bush as the devil incarnate.

Thanks to ISIS and the collapse and retreat of the Iraqi Army from Northern Iraq, the Iraqi Kurds are now in a much stronger position political politically than at any time since 2003. (It helps that Turkey is not only no longer trying to undermine the Kurdish Regional Government; it has become a regional friend and economic partner of the fledgling state.)

But in terms of security the Iraqi Kurds are in greater danger than they have been at any time since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

Between 2003 and 2011 they had to be on their guard against the threat presented by Arab Iraq’s various insurgents and militias. But they had powerful allies in the form of Coalition forces and an Iraqi army that was being mentored and guided by the Coalition. And they were able by and large to keep terrorists out and down. Now they are effectively alone as they confront the ISIS Caliphate along a 1000km border.

There have already been deadly clashes with ISIS in places where the Pershmerga – the Kurdish armed forces – have taken over cities abandoned by the Iraqi army. And the Pershmerga have not always come out on top.

ISIS front line forces may not be that numerous but they are experienced, well-trained operators, thanks to years of fighting in both the Iraqi insurgency and the Syrian civil war. They also have a significant advantage over the Peshmerga in that they now have, thanks to the sudden flight of the Iraqi army, an impressive arsenal of modern weaponry, much of it US-supplied.

That includes at least 1500 armoured Humvees and MRAPs, 52 modern 155mm howitzers, a number of M1 tanks and even helicopters

The vehicles may not be easy to keep running over time without spare parts or the expertise of foreign contractors. But ISIS, like its predecessor al Qaeda in Iraq, includes in its ranks plenty of former Iraqi army soldiers who know how to use artillery and other heavy weapons.

The Peshmerga lack heavy weaponry and aircraft, and all their recent experience has been fighting small numbers of insurgents and terrorists rather than an actual army. Among the supplies the Kurds need is electronic jamming equipment to combat IEDs. They have requested some from Britain. However, the UK, like the US, has so far refused to send defence equipment to the KRG unless end-user certificates are supplied for them by the central government in Baghdad. This the Maliki government refuses to do.

If we help the Kurds, it will protect an oasis of stability and democracy and tolerance. And it will cement a natural friendship that could be of enormous strategic benefit to both the West and Kurdistan. (After all it is only 400 or so miles from Kurdistan to both Tehran and Tiblisi.)

If we don’t, Iraqi Kurdistan will have to look elsewhere, most likely to Teheran or perhaps Moscow. Or that oasis could be overwhelmed by the violence and chaos that is spreading outward from Syria.

Neither would be good outcomes; both are easily avoidable. It’s up to Downing Street and the White House to do the right thing.

 

http://www.breitbart.com/Breitbart-London/2014/07/23/Memo-to-Washington-Stop-messing-the-Kurds-around-and-supply-them-with-weapons-before-it-s-too-late

Building the US-Kurdistan Special Relationship (WSJ, July 10, 2014)

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A U.S. base in Kurdistan would improve the U.S.’s strategic position in the region while guaranteeing Kurdish independence.

 The Iraqi government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is reeling from the sudden loss of key northern cities to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. Baghdad is looking increasingly to Iran and Russia for military assistance. That’s led some foreign policy gurus in Washington to call for a closer U.S. relationship with Iraq’s autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government, or KRG. It’s a good idea, but they aren’t going far enough.

The time has come for America and the West to support Kurdish independence and, simultaneously, to set up U.S. bases in Iraqi Kurdistan that would make it America’s military hub in the region.

After all, this country-in-the-making has proved to be a haven of stability, relative security and pro-American, pro-Western sentiment ever since it broke free from Saddam’s misrule. A major American air base in Kurdistan would improve the U.S.’s much-weakened strategic position in the Middle East while guaranteeing Kurdish independence.

Not long ago such an alliance would have been politically all but impossible. Regional powers were reluctant to support Kurdish independence for a variety of reasons, not least the fact that Washington was adamant in its support of a unitary Iraqi state within the borders set by colonial powers after World War I.

Since the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the U.S. has tended to disregard Kurdistan’s aspirations and even hindered the KRG’s efforts to develop and profit from the oil resources on its territory. That’s because America’s priorities have generally been to bolster the government in Baghdad, in which Washington had invested vast amounts of blood and treasure, and to maintain good relations with neighboring Turkey.

Ankara is a NATO member that was long dominated by a military establishment fanatically hostile to any manifestation of Kurdish independence anywhere in the region. These days, however, the Turkish military has lost much of its political influence, and Turkish businessmen are among the biggest investors in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Mr. Maliki’s Iraqi government, meanwhile, has effectively become a client of Iran after being largely abandoned by the Obama administration following a half-hearted attempt to make an agreement allowing for a rump force of US troops. Iranian influence is unlikely to diminish in the immediate future, whether or not Tehran’s assistance helps Baghdad stop the ISIS advance and recapture lost territory.

Kurdistan’s economic success, and the military prowess of its peshmerga troops, mean that the KRG’s strength has increased relative to Mr. Maliki’s in Baghdad. The region has enjoyed what amounts to de facto independence from Baghdad since 2003 and a great deal of autonomy since the establishment of a no-fly zone in the wake of the first Gulf War. Perhaps the most pro-American ethnic group in the entire region, and for good reason, Iraq’s Kurds were the Coalition’s most loyal and effective allies during the eight-year war there.

Early in the Iraq war, the KRG encouraged the U.S. to take advantage of the stability and security of the region. It offered air bases and R&R facilities in the mountains that could have made long troop deployments much easier to bear for U.S. forces. Both offers were turned down.

Now that hundreds of thousands of Americans in uniform are no longer being sent to fight in Iraq’s baking deserts and broiling cities, the R&R facilities aren’t needed. But given how quickly the region is changing, and given what Washington should now understand about the fragility of Arab tyrannies, America could certainly use an air base in Kurdistan.

U.S. military planners can’t assume that our alliance with Turkey won’t decline further. Nor should they assume as given Turkey’s military cooperation with NATO for missions against adversaries in places like Syria and Iran.

And it would be even more foolish for American policy makers to assume that U.S. forces will always be able to use bases in Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain. All three countries are autocracies vulnerable to upheaval. So far, adroit use of their fantastic wealth has protected these countries’ rulers against the resentments of their subjects, but this may not always be the case.

Moreover, Kuwait and Qatar are arguably “frenemies” rather than true allies of the U.S. It’s no secret that elements within their ruling elites have long sponsored and encouraged jihadist terrorism and fundamentalism in the same way that Saudi princelings have. As for Bahrain, it is something close to an apartheid state, with a Sunni elite brutally repressing a Shiite majority. As the author Ralph Peters has famously written, in the end, “the Shah always falls.”

A new U.S. Air Force base near the Kurdish cities such as Sulaymaniyah or Erbil—both of which already boast airports with suitably long runways—would radically increase American leverage over everyone in the region, in particular Iran and Syria. Both Sulaymaniyah and Erbil are within 600 miles of Tehran.

The presence of such a base might even make it easier to deter the Iranian mullahs, since the chances of a successful U.S. strike on Iranian nuclear facilities would be that much greater. Such a move would also guarantee Kurdish independence in a very concrete way—the price likely to be demanded, quite fairly, by the Iraqi Kurds.

The Obama administration would have to be uncharacteristically bold to make such a breach with past policies and with the State Department’s traditional preference for maintaining postcolonial borders. And there is no question that deepening the U.S. military partnership with the KRG would carry risks for landlocked Kurdistan and for America. But both would be in a stronger long-term position to face an uncertain future in a chaotic region.

Mr. Foreman covered the Iraq war for the New York Post.

http://online.wsj.com/articles/the-u-s-should-guarantee-kurdish-independence-1405020652

Secretiveness and Dishonesty in the Aid Sector, Ch. 35

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In the aid world you hear a lot of rhetoric about “transparency” and “accountability”, but both are in troublingly short supply. This is especially the case at some of the powerful mega-charities. So it was good to see this OpEd piece in the London Times by Stephen Pollard calling for more openness in the UK charitable sector.

For those unable to access the piece behind the Times paywall, one key passage reads:

If an organisation is going to enjoy the benefits that society grants to charities, including exemption from inheritance and other taxes, then the rest of us are entitled to at least an inkling of how it spends our money.

Pollard’s starting point is a new reform proposed by the Charity Commission that would require charities to be open about how much money they spend on political campaigning.

It is not surprising that such an innocuous-seeming, public spirited reform might provoke hysterical opposition – as it already has – in the NGO sector.

Transparency would mean that Oxfam and others would have to be honest about where public contributions are really going:  they would have to tell Granny that her fiver isn’t actually going to feed the hungry or provide shelter for the homeless; it’s going to be spent, er, addressing the “root causes” of hunger and homelessness, by campaigning against the Coalition government or against free trade or for higher taxes for large corporations….

Those who run the charitable sector in the UK have enjoyed minimal oversight over the years. They have therefore become accustomed to operating in an environment in which secretiveness and even dishonesty has no downside.  To some degree the shady behavior that has ensued, and the amazingly self-interested and smug attitudes of charity executives and lobbyists is not  their fault. It is also the fault of a political class and a general public that are foolishly and ignorantly dazzled into myopia by the moral glamour of “charity”.

Both charities and those they are trying to help deserve better.

Roger Ebert, R.I.P. (NRO April 5, 2013)

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I was shocked to hear last night of Roger Ebert’s death. This was partly because only yesterday I read a blog post, written by him on Tuesday, in which he announced that he was about to take a “leave of presence” from his fearsome schedule of film reviews (more than 200 in 2012) but was relaunching his website, rogerebert.com.

But I was shocked also because, like many of those who had the good fortune to encounter Roger Ebert in life, on the page, or on screen, I had somehow come to believe that he would always be there. He had not only survived a brutal cancer, he had kept on reviewing at a punishing pace even when that cancer had taken away his jaw and his ability to speak. It therefore seemed logical, as well as comforting, to believe that Ebert had won, thanks to his astonishing courage, force of will, and desire to write, and that he would simply keep going with work of undiminished quality for yet more decades.

Sadly, it is not to be. And as I myself begin to miss him, I suspect that Roger Ebert will be more missed than any journalist in America of his generation, and of the generations that have come after.

Not only was Ebert probably the most widely read critic in the history of film and film writing, he had a unique, intimate relationship with tens of millions of people, many of whom, having read him since adolescence, had fallen in love with his quiet, honest, educated, and unpretentious voice and felt that they knew him.

Because Ebert had reviewed films on TV as well as written about them for the papers, because most of his reviews had a conversational tone (which is another reason why so many readers felt he was speaking directly to them), and perhaps because he had been around for so long, there were sophisticates who didn’t take Ebert as seriously as they did some of the critics for New York–based papers and magazines.

This was a misjudgment — a jejune error of the kind that Ebert himself would never make. For Roger Ebert was at least as smart and knowledgeable as his supposedly more highbrow rivals. But he was also a confident, old-fashioned democratic intellectual who believed in the intelligence of the mass moviegoing audience and in the intelligence of a mass readership, and was utterly unmoved by snobbery of any kind.

That confidence, and that desire to communicate his love and understanding of film to the widest possible audience, meant there was no place in Ebert’s writing for obscurity or name-dropping. He was never flashy. And he was never a show-off (though he had much to show off about, most obviously his encyclopedic knowledge of film history). Yet he was steeped in literature and deeply engaged with the rest of the culture, and the fruits of all that reading and listening and talking and watching consistently enriched and leavened his film criticism.

Whenever I go back and look up a film from the 2000s or 1990s or 1980s in the archive of his Chicago Sun-Times reviews (which I do often, as you really can’t do better for thoughtful, well-written, and reliably non-crazy summaries of films you are thinking of seeing or cannot remember), I am struck by how humane and decent and commonsensical his opinions usually were.

Some of our most lauded critics, in particular those who took after Pauline Kael, have had an adolescent weakness for gratuitous violence and cruelty. Not Ebert. Moreover, even when other critics were lavishing praise on filmmakers whose incompetence and pretentiousness looked liked profundity, he kept his head and heart about him.

Unlike, say, Andrew Sarris, a charming and clever critic whose “auteurist” criticism revealed a near-total ignorance of how movies are actually made, Ebert recognized the importance of the screenwriter and the editor in Hollywood films. (He himself had penned the screenplay for Beyond the Valley of the Ultra Vixens.)

I am sad to say that I met Roger only a handful of times. He was far friendlier than a critic and journalist of his fame and distinction — indeed, than a national treasure — had any need to be. He and his beautiful wife, Chaz, were charming and funny and wonderfully tolerant of those younger and less-experienced critics, like myself, rendered febrile by the glamour and excitement of their first Cannes or Toronto film festival.

Now as I recall the man and his work, all I can think about is the astonishing bravery with which he met the physical challenges of his last decade, how he overcame pain and mutilation that would cripple most people with despair, in order to continue his nearly five decades of engagement with the movies and his readers. Later I will face the fact of his loss, the shocking reality that no new Ebert reviews will ever be added to that huge trove of educated, thoughtful, heartfelt opinion, the feeling of emptiness that comes with the final silencing of a journalistic voice that in its intimate way was as important and influential as any in American history.

 

http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/344755/roger-ebert-rip-jonathan-foreman

'Black Hawk Down', Two Decades Later (NRO Oct. 5, 2013)

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How an extraordinary feat of arms was turned into a political catastrophe.

October 3rd and 4th marked the 20th anniversary of the “Black Hawk Down” incident in Somalia, also known as the First Battle of Mogadishu. The BBC ran a video report about it on Thursday entitled “US Black Hawk Down military disaster revisited.” It is worth watching as an encapsulation of a complacent standard media narrative about the battle that has not changed in two decades. (Disappointingly, the lazy analysis here is by Frank Gardner, the BBC’s normally impressive security correspondent.)

Contrary to the BBC’s assertion in the report, the Black Hawk Down battle was not a “humiliation” for the U.S. military. On the contrary, it was arguably an astonishing feat of arms, analogous to the 1879 battle of Rorke’s Drift depicted in the film Zulu, or the 400 B.C. retreat to the sea by Xenophon’s 10,000 beleaguered Greeks depicted in his Anabasis.

It took tremendous skill and genuine heroism for a small, vastly outnumbered group of U.S. soldiers to hold off thousands of fighters and in some cases fight their way out of a teeming, hostile city along the “Mogadishu Mile” without leaving any wounded behind. If anyone was defeated, it was those thousands of well-armed Somali militiamen, who knew the terrain far better than the Americans.

Of course, the original mission to capture two key lieutenants of the warlord “general” Mohamed Farah Aidid was a failure. It was badly planned and fundamentally foolish in conception, and 18 American servicemen were killed as a result. But if you look at how U.S. forces dealt with their situation after the original plan had come apart and their men were trapped on hostile ground, it’s hard not to be impressed.

So the U.S. military was bruised, but far from humiliated. Nor was America itself humiliated — at least, not initially. National humiliation came about later, thanks to Washington’s political reaction to the incident, and to the fact that the 18 killed in action and the gruesome video footage of two American corpses being abused were sufficient to make America withdraw its forces from Somalia, even though the United States had not achieved its humanitarian or security objectives in the country.

It was that decision, not the (admittedly skillful and courageous) downing of two Black Hawk helicopters by Somali fighters, that so impressed Osama bin Laden (who cited it often as evidence of the fundamental weakness and cowardice of America and her military) and emboldened the likes of Slobodan Milosevic when he continued his ethnic cleansing in defiance of U.S. threats.

Because the American political and military elite at the time deemed it acceptable to cut and run immediately after this single bloody setback, American foreign policy was reshaped around a reflexive terror of any entanglement that might risk more than a handful of casualties. Hence the failure of the Clinton administration to try to stop the Rwandan genocide even though there were U.S. combat troops in neighboring countries who could have done so. There is a strong argument that hundreds of thousands of people needlessly died as a result of that panicked overreaction.

Since I watched the BBC report at my desk in Kabul, this anniversary has a particularly strong resonance for me. There is currently huge pressure in Washington to cut and run from Afghanistan as soon and as fully as possible, regardless of where things actually stand here, and regardless of how that might render pointless the vast amounts of treasure and blood spent over 12 years, and regardless of the potential impact on American power and prestige.

This is not to say that there shouldn’t be an endgame, or that Afghan forces must fend for themselves (it would help if the coalition had spent the last few years building a small air force suitable for close air support), or that a winding down of our presence is a mistake. It is to say that American policy makers need to keep in mind the possibly disastrous impact of a perceived surrender and defeat if they care about America’s future influence and prosperity.

http://www.nationalreview.com/article/360431/black-hawk-down-two-decades-later-jonathan-foreman

Defeat in the "Information Battle Space" (National Review May 17, 2007)

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The Western media, wittingly or not, are aiding our enemies

Islamabad — The week I was in Afghanistan this winter, two big stories hit the international press. The first involved the publication of photographs of German NATO troops apparently “desecrating” the remains of dead Afghans. The second was about the accidental killing of up to two hundred Afghan civilians in an allied airstrike. Both stories were sensational, unfairly reported, and illustrative of one of the most intractable difficulties that face the NATO-led ISAF Coalition in Afghanistan — and, indeed, the West generally in the “war on terror.”

The photographs of the Bundeswehr squad posing with shiny, white skulland bones were immediately said to reveal an “atrocity.” More than two years old when they first surfaced in Germany at the end of October, the photos provoked a predictably anguished debate, both there and in other NATO states, about the brutalization of war, the foolishness of the mission in Afghanistan, and so forth.

JUMPING TO CONCLUSIONS
The accusation that 21st-century German soldiers were desecrating Muslim graves was a possibility transmuted into fact by a media that all too often — consciously or unconsciously — assumes the worst of Coalition forces and their mission in Afghanistan.

First of all, it was far from clear from the photos and initial reports whether the bones in question had been dug up by the soldiers or merely found on the ground. It is not hard to find skulls littering the rocky earth in the Konduz area where the Germans have their main base. The wrecked vehicles scattered about Konduz bear witness to the many battles fought in this part of Afghanistan over the years. Indeed, though the Northern Alliance battled the Taliban on a number of occasions here, it is most likely that any skulls the Germans found were actually those of Soviet troops — the mujahedeen did not usually trouble themselves to bury the bodies of their slain enemies. In other words, the remains that the Germans posed with were probably neither Muslim nor obtained by grave robbing, but had been bleaching under the sun for up to two decades before they inspired a juvenile digital photo-op.

The damage, however, was done. Though the “atrocity” might one day be refuted — most likely in some little-publicized investigation that takes months to unfold — the news had flashed around the world that German Coalition troops were treating Muslim corpses with contempt. The Western journalists who reported the story with such concerned relish may not have realized that by treating the photographs asprima facie evidence of a genuine scandal they were undermining the Coalition in Afghanistan, supporting the myth of “Islamophobia,” and fomenting anti-Western hatred. They probably thought they were just doing their jobs in the normal, “neutral” fashion. 

SELECTIVE SKEPTICISM 
The second story is even more illustrative of the nearly impossible task faced by the Coalition — and the way the media make it even more difficult. In the last week of October, British and Canadian troops fighting the Taliban in Kandahar province were attacked near the Sperwan Ghar patrol base. As night fell on October 24, the NATO troops called in close air support against Taliban positions. According to local chiefs, a large number of civilians were killed in the bombing. Over the next couple of days the claims of civilian fatalities ranged from 20 to 200 — a telling discrepancy, and one that probably reflects the tendency of predominantly oral cultures like that of rural Afghanistan to foster rumor and exaggeration. ISAF spokesmen admitted that, of an estimated total 70 fatalities, some civilians might have been killed in the strike out (four wounded civilians were taken to Kandahar airbase for treatment). They doubted the “at least 89” number quoted by most media outlets, which was usually followed by the point that this was the largest number of civilian deaths in a single incident since 2002.

As NATO officers privately complained, no one could be sure of the truth in the immediate aftermath of the air strike. Because of the Muslim practice of burying the dead within 24 hours, there are often no bodies to be found in incidents like this. Moreover it is the standard operating procedure of the Taliban to “sanitize” or remove weapons from the corpses of any slain or wounded members they don’t take away — so you can be sure that a civilian fatality really is a civilian only if the corpse is that of a small child or a woman.

A knowledgeable, thoughtful, and clear-eyed reporter might also consider that local civilians in areas dominated by the Taliban almost always claim that there are no Taliban, and have never been any Taliban, in their area. They make this claim out of either fear or loyalty. During fierce fighting in September in the same Panjwayi area, the local elders also claimed, absurdly, that there were no Taliban around, even though more than 500 of them were killed in pitched battles there and the area is at the center of the movement’s heartland.

More important, it is standard operating procedure of the Islamists in Afghanistan — as it is in Lebanon and Gaza and Iraq — to claim that all casualties on their side are civilians. Indeed, the Taliban would be grossly incompetant at asymmetric and information warfare if they didn’t make that claim. (Just as al Qaeda operatives and sympathizers would be foolish if they did not cry “torture” when detained at Gitmo or elsewhere.)

After all, it would be a huge propaganda victory for the Taliban and their allies to create the impression that Coalition troops routinely or increasingly kill large numbers of civilians. Once established as a media “fact,” such an impression would not only undermine the Afghan government and ISAF, but it could also affect the strategic, and very real, battle for hearts and minds in Europe and the United States.

Make no mistake, the Taliban and their allies, like the Sunni insurgents in Iraq, know perfectly well that they don’t have to defeat the Coalition militarily; all they have to do is undermine the political will of the Western electorates.

 

You might expect journalists to take some note of these practices and of the propaganda element of the war, and accordingly to exercise a little caution, if not skepticism, before they unquestioningly parrot an allegation of mass civilian deaths. (Surely they must be aware that reports of an atrocity can have enormous real world effects? Surely they have some sense that various Afghan players might lie in order to advance their cause?) Generally, however, they do not. For the most part, Taliban claims are assumed to be true. Statements by Coalition spokesmen, on the other hand, are a different matter. Such officials are said to make “claims,” and they are essentially assumed to be propagandists, if not flat out liars, by many correspondents (who won’t say as much in print, of course, but ask them about it over a drink).

It is one of the ironies of our time that members of the media are so hypersensitive to being used or manipulated by any official person from their own society — military officials, government spokesmen, etc. — but can be as naïve as children when it comes to voices from other cultures. This would almost be laughable, if it weren’t so pathetic — and so poisonous. For instance, the BBC loves to quote Iraqi doctors about Coalition-inflicted casualties, apparently oblivious of the fact that the Iraqi medical profession was open almost exclusively to Baathists, is predominantly Sunni, and did extremely well under Saddam.

There is sometimes a strange, sentimental, inverted racism at work in this: Surely such simple, ardent, technologically unsophisticated people — like the mullah who speaks for the village, or the weeping mother who swears her slain son was a good boy and would never have shot at the soldiers — wouldn’t tell lies? While there is no justification for reverting to Edwardian-era bigotry and assuming that all Orientals, especially South Asians, are compulsive liars, it would be equally wrong to assume the opposite or to ignore the role of rumor and the likelihood of deceit in a place like Afghanistan.

WHERE’S THE COMPETENCE?
In general the mainstream media have taken even longer to understand asymmetric warfare in the instant-information age than the U.S. military. Their understanding of traditional military concepts is abysmal enough. It is a painful fact that many contemporary war correspondents know virtually nothing of military ranks, weapons, and tactics. Someone who calls the dropping of a single JDAM “carpet bombing” and who doesn’t know if a company is larger or smaller than a battalion is hardly likely to be able to tell the difference between genuine “collateral damage” — the unwitting, and in some cases avoidable, killing of non-combatants — and a deliberate massacre.

Nor do many reporters get that the U.S. and its allies are fighting an enemy that thinks nothing of using ambulances to ferry troops and ammunition (as the Marines discovered to their cost in Fallujah; when they eventually fired on the ambulance/troop carriers, the BBC accused them of war crimes.) It is an enemy that routinely employs hospitals, museums, schools, and mosques as firing positions, and exploits Western sensibilities and legal norms by using women and children as human shields. Such tactics inevitably lead to civilian casualties (which is why they are illegal under the laws of war). But they make total, terrible sense if you are al Qaeda or Hezbollah.

You are more likely to win on the ground if the Americans or Brits or Israelis refrain from firing on your ambulance/mosque/school packed with fighters; and if they do fire on you, you win in the propaganda battle. The pictures on al Jazeera and CNN of a smoking ambulance or corpse of a child are worth the deaths of the fighters and their civilian shields.

Much reporting from the field fails to take into account the fact that the traditional legal distinction between civilian and non-civilian has little bearing on the reality of war in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. A more relevant and sensible distinction might be between combatant and non-combatant. After all, the Taliban, like their insurgent cousins in Iraq, are civilians in arms who don’t wear uniforms — thus putting civilian non-combatants in jeopardy and breaching the Geneva Convention. Moreover, more than a few of the attacks against Coalition and Afghan army forces are carried out by civilian Pashtuns who are not even members of the Taliban, but mere opportunists — indebted farmers, unemployed youths — who have been paid well to take a potshot or two at a passing patrol.

COMMUNICATION FAILURE
The U.S. military information-apparatus has so far failed to make Western publics or the press understand the implications of all this. It is a failure that has strategic implications. Unfortunately it may be impossible for allied spokesmen to overcome the naïveté, faux or otherwise, of the mainstream media. Too many establishment journalists live in a mental world dominated by the reporting tropes of the later Vietnam War: “five o’clock follies,” lame attempts at censorship, demoralized draftees “fragging” officers, exaggerated body counts, Pentagon lies, and virtuous Viet Cong patriots. Too few of them have a genuine understanding of either military culture or the third-world cultures of areas in which our wars are taking place.

At the end of my visit to Afghanistan, I sat in on at a press conference at the huge Bagram airbase where the local representatives of the international media pressed General James L. Jones, then supreme commander of NATO, about the latest news in the war. “Isn’t it true that the civilian casualties and the skulls incident have undermined NATO’s efforts to win hearts and minds,” asked one reporter for a top news agency. The assumption behind his question was that these stories had already reached small, rural villages and that such stories have the power to undermine the building of roads and schools. More tellingly, the question treated the existence of the stories and the impressions they created as something uncontrollable and inevitable, rather than something for which he and his colleagues bore responsibility. The general calmly pointed out that the enemy uses civilians as human shields and likes to spread lies about the Coalition — points that made no impact on the assembled press — then personally apologized for any civilian deaths and, rightly, promised a full investigation.

It may turn out that the reports were accurate, that allied airmen did indeed kill a large number of civilians because of faulty intelligence or some other aspect of the fog of war. But if the 90 to 200 so-called civilian deaths were either mythical or primarily composed of Taliban warriors, the press that was so sure of allied guilt will have acted once again as an unwitting ally of some very nasty people.

– Jonathan Foreman is a reporter who has covered the war from Iraq and Afghanistan.

http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/220979/defeat-information-battle-space/jonathan-foreman

When the Fix is In (National Review, Sept 10, 2007)

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Fixers, interpreters, and reporting from Iraq 

 
A British colleague of mine was sent by his newspaper to Iraq in 2005, just before the July 7 bombings in London. After that attack, his editor asked him to canvass “ordinary Iraqis” for their reaction. The resulting article reported that all but one of the twelve Baghdadis my colleague spoke to were delighted that Londoners had been blown up. This seemed a surprisingly high proportion, so I asked him a few days later just who these interviewees were and how he’d found them. 
 
With slight sheepishness, he admitted that all the Iraqis he’d canvassed were Sunni Arabs. In other words, his straw poll had been confined to members of a minority that makes up less than 25 percent of the Iraqi population — the same minority that dominated the country for 80 years, that feels humiliated by the empowerment of the Shiite-Kurd majority, and that forms the basis of the anti-coalition insurgency. 
 
How had the British reporter come to meet these interviewees? It turned out that they had been selected by his interpreter and his “fixer.” I asked him to tell me about these persons — good interpreters and fixers being costly and hard to find. Well, my colleague said with an enthusiastic smile, “Ahmed,” his excellent fixer, had done sterling work for him since 2003 and before, when he had been employed by Saddam’s ministry of information. As for his interpreter, “Muhammad” — also terrific — he’d been a colonel in the Republican Guard. Both, it hardly need be said, are Sunnis and former members of the Baath party. 
 
That this journalist — otherwise honest and relatively unbiased — relied entirely on Sunni Arabs is bad enough. For a journalist to rely on Iraqis with such backgrounds is arguably like going to Germany in 1945 and hiring a former employee of Josef Goebbels as your fixer and a recently retired SS officer as your translator. Yet it had never occurred to my colleague that his choices were problematic, or that his employees might have an agenda of their own. 
 
This is a pattern all too common among Western news organizations in Iraq. Sunni Arabs are vastly overrepresented among the employees of such organizations, which are becoming more and more dependent on local hires for actual shoe-leather reporting. Ask any producer or correspondent who has worked in Iraq what community his interpreter or fixer is from, and the answer will almost certainly be the Sunni Arabs. 
 
One reason for this is that, long after 2003, major news organizations continued to rely on the fixers and translators they had hired in Iraq before the war began — including some staffers whose links with Saddam’s regime, and its secret police, brought access. (At the height of the invasion, Western-media reliance on Saddam’s flacks — official or not — sometimes led to embarrassing incidents, such as the insistence of the BBC’s Andrew Gilligan that American forces had not reached Baghdad Airport even as Fox News was showing footage of U.S. tanks on the runway.) 
 
Of course, one benefit of reliance on Iraqis with strong links to the old regime is access to insurgent spokesmen. Another is safety: You are less likely to be kidnapped or ambushed if you’re paying more than $100 a day to an insurgent’s brother. 
 
One might ask how much this reliance on Sunnis affects media objectivity. Allow me to relate my own experience. My first driver-interpreter in Baghdad, in the spring of 2003, was a Christian — a former U.N. employee who took me to visit his large and delightful family in a tidy, very pro-coalition Christian enclave. Getting to know them was an emotionally powerful experience, and probably did influence my perspective, even though I knew they weren’t necessarily “typical” Baghdadis. Most honest foreign reporters would admit that it’s hard not to assimilate the point of view of the local driver/interpreter/fixer who gets you your scoops and on whom your life may depend. 
 
I would argue that the reliance on Sunni Arabs has had a powerful if subtle effect on war reporting. Certainly it’s not hard to find circumstantial evidence of pro-Sunni and anti-Shiite bias in the mainstream Western media. Most people who watch network news or read the major papers have no idea that almost every marketplace and mosque bomb that goes off in Iraq is an attack on Shiite civilians by Sunni terrorists. That is because the sectarian nature of these attacks generally goes unmentioned — they are presented as nondenominational “insurgent” bombs going off in crowded public places. 
 
But when, after the destruction of Samarra’s Golden Mosque in February 2006, Ayatollah Sistani could no longer hold back a people enraged by three years of violence against them and Shiite militias began to target Sunnis, sectarian identity suddenly became important in much of the reporting from Iraq. Now the stories were about “Shiite death squads” and incipient civil war. In other words, it was only when Shiites began to fight back that the bloodshed was deemed sectarian. Even now, if you look at the stories about ethnic cleansing, the victims profiled by the New York Times and the Washington Post tend to be Sunnis. The car bombs that slaughter scores or even hundreds of Shiite civilians are still just “insurgent” attacks, not attacks by Sunni death squads. 
 
As if that weren’t bad enough, the Times and other papers frequently stereotype the Shiite majority as primitive, misogynist, cinema-torching tribals — unlike those nice, well-educated, secular Baathists so foolishly overthrown by the Bush administration. The pro-Sunni, anti-Shiite tilt is also evident in a reluctance to give voice to members of the majority populations (unless of course they are Sadrist extremists) or to the many brave Iraqis who are struggling to make a go of democratic government. Elected Iraqi leaders such as President Jalal Talabani and Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih (both Kurds) are all too often rejected when they want to place op-eds in major newspapers. 
 
Another factor reinforcing the pro-Sunni bias may be the widespread employment of Palestinians by foreign news organizations in Iraq. Some of these are Iraqi-born Palestinians such as Khalid Hassan, the young New York Times reporter tragically murdered in July. Others are professional newsmen imported by U.S. and European organizations from elsewhere in the Middle East, including the West Bank (where many cameramen have been trained by Western media). It happens that all Muslim Palestinians are Sunni. Moreover, no group in Iraq was more loyal to Saddam Hussein than the Palestinians — and vice versa. The Palestinians were rewarded for their loyalty with privileges such as high-rise housing on and near Baghdad’s then-prosperous Haifa Street — and with the hatred of much of the Iraqi people. Indeed, xenophobic Iraqis — most Iraqis, that is — generally hate Palestinians even more than they hate Kuwaitis and Egyptians. 
 
This certainly does not mean that all Palestinians in the employ of Western news organizations in Iraq are hostile to the aspirations of Iraq’s Shiite and Kurd majority, or regret the passing of the Saddam regime, or support the insurgency. Or that, if they do have such leanings, it necessarily distorts their work. But it is interesting that so many media organizations rely heavily on the one ethnic group that arguably has the most reason to resent the coalition and sympathize with the insurgents. As one Iraqi friend said to me bitterly, “Why don’t they just go to Saudi and hire their reporters from the most extreme madrassas, or go to Damascus and get their reporters from Syrian intelligence?” 
 
The great irony is that the same organizations and professionals that don’t look too hard at the backgrounds of their fixers and interpreters tend to wring their hands over the supposed bias-inducing effects of embedding reporters with the U.S. military. I wish I had a dollar for every time I’ve heard a mainstream-media editor worry that an embed’s “dependence” on his hosts might compromise his “objectivity” — as if all foreign journalists didn’t develop potentially unhealthy relationships, not just with translators and fixers, but with local journalists, government spokesmen, and other key sources. 
 
The willingness of so many experienced Western reporters to be guided and gulled by the most anti-coalition and anti-democratic elements of Iraqi society is hard to forgive. In conjunction with other institutional failings, it may have influenced the progress of a war in which perceptions and morale are the key to victory and defeat.